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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

A.

Nature 0f the Case.
This appeal concerns a dispute over the right to purchase 65 acres ofundeveloped property

at the

south end 0f Priest Lake near the town 0f Coolin, Idaho (the “Property”). In June 2016,

Appellant Estate 0f Frances Elaine Warren (the “Estate”) and Respondent Tricore Investments,

LLC (“Tricore”) signed a purchase and sale agreement (the “Tricore PSA”) for the Property which
Tricore planned t0 develop into waterfront

inter alia,

from the

it

The Tricore

PSA was

not enforceable because,

violated the statute 0f frauds for lack 0f a precise description ofproperty t0 be excluded

sale (“not less than

would hold

lots.

title

t0 the

200

feet

0f waterfront”), there was n0 meeting 0f the minds as

t0

excluded property during platting, and there was no meeting 0f the minds

0n how much land was being bought and

sold. In

August, Tricore’s owner Clifford Mort (“Mort”)

realized that 318 feet of beachfront property he planned to develop

was not included

in the sale.

That 3 1 8-f00t section 0f frontage was a crucial part 0f Tricore’s planned development, and

would

drastically affect

demanded

its

by hundreds of thousands 0f

dollars,

were negotiating forward

Around the same
be selling the property.

at

n0 charge.

John Finney (“Finney”), negotiated with Tricore throughout August.

Based 0n Tricore’s statements, Finney believed Tricore had repudiated the Tricore
parties

loss

and added new

terms including a water system, water rights, and 160,000 cubic yards of ﬁll material
attorney,

its

overall performance. Tricore attempted to renegotiate the deal,

that the Estate reduce the price

The Estate’s

who

to reach a

new agreement With

PSA

and the

different terms.

time, Appellant John Stockton (“Stockton”) learned that the Estate might

He

held a long-standing right 0f ﬁrst refusal on the sale of all the Estate’s

Priest

Lake property. Stockton and

his neighbor, Appellant

Todd Brinkmeyer (“Brinkmeyer”),

agreed t0 partner and exercise Stockton’s right 0f ﬁrst refusal. The Estate negotiated With potential

buyers Tricore and Stockton and Brinkmeyer, seeking the best deal

Although the Estate eventually disclosed the Tricore
Finney purposely Withheld his belief that the Tricore

PSA

PSA was

it

could

get.

to Stockton

and Brinkmeyer,

not enforceable.

He wanted

Stockton and Brinkmeyer to believe Tricore was buying the property, otherwise he feared they

would not buy

it.

At a meeting 0n September

0f ﬁrst refusal, that Stockton’s right

would honor Stockton’s
t0 Stockton

right

t0

2, the Estate

agreed that Stockton held a valid right

purchase the Property was superior t0 Tricore’s, that

by repudiating

the Tricore

PSA, and

that

it

would

sell the

it

Property

and Brinkmeyer. Based 0n those representations, Stockton and Brinkmeyer agreed

to

purchase the Property.
This appeal arises from the
Tricore

PSA

trial

court’s

judgment ordering the speciﬁc performance 0f the

and the conveyance 0f the Property

the Estate breached the Tricore

PSA,

to Tricore.

that Stockton

that they

trial

court committed several errors and should be reversed.

B.

trial

court found, inter alia, that

and Brinkmeyer tortiously interfered with

and

engaged

The

in a civil conspiracy with the Estate to breach

it.

As

it,

discussed below, the

Statement of Facts and Course 0f Proceedings.
1.

Stockton acquires a right 0f ﬁrst refusal t0 purchase any property sold by the

Warren

family.

Stockton and Brinkmeyer

own

neighboring lake cabins on the south end 0f Priest Lake

near the town 0f Coolin, Idaho. R. 1995-96. Stockton and Brinkmeyer’s parents both purchased

their lots

from the Warren family, which has owned much of the land

in the area for generations.

R. 1994-995; Tr. 566:22-568:6 (Stockton); Tr. 643: 13-643z22 (Brinkmeyer). Stockton entered into
a contract to purchase his lot in 1989. Tr. 566:22-56826.

struck, the

Warren family was approached by

additional lake frontage t0 the east 0f their parcel,

A few months

after the

agreement was

the Brinkmeyers with a request t0 purchase

Which

at the

time was not developed. R. 1994-

995; Tr. 643:13-22, 705:21-706zl7 (Brinkmeyer). The Warren family informed the Brinkmeyers
that they

had already agreed to

something

out.

Tr.

sell the

frontage in question t0 Stockton, but they

would try to work

70627-17 (Brinkmeyer).

The Warren family then approached Stockton and asked
his lot approximately

60

feet t0 the east in order to free

if

he would be willing to move

up additional frontage

for the Brinkmeyers.

R. 1994-995; Tr. 568:2-13, 56927-11 (Stockton). In exchange, the Warren family offered Stockton
a right of ﬁrst refusal 0n any property that they might
Tr. 56822-13,

569 7:11 (Stockton);

on a handshake
(Stockton).

basis,

Tr.

sell in the future.

R. 1995; EX. 8

(COE

106);

705:21-706zl7 (Brinkmeyer). Stockton accepted the offer

and the boundaries of his

The Brinkmeyers then purchased

lot

were moved prior

the frontage that

t0 closing. Tr. 56927-22

had been freed up by the

shift.

R.

1994-1995; Tr. 643217-22 (Brinkmeyer).

Although

it

was never reduced

to writing, Stockton’s right

frequent discussion through the years, and

Estate,

When

and Stockton.

Tr.

it

0f ﬁrst refusal was a topic of

was always acknowledged by

the

Warren

family, the

570:21-571220 (Stockton); Tr. 665:23-666:12, 70724-22 (Brinkmeyer).

they have sold property in the years since 1990, the Warren family has consistently given

Stockton the ﬁrst opportunity t0 purchase before approaching other potentially interested buyers.

R. 1995-996; Ex. 11

(COE

112-1 13); Tr. 570:1-3, 571 :18-20 (Stockton).

2.

The Estate

In

May 2014, the Estatel

frontage at the

offers Stockton some,

but not

0f the Property.

approached Stockton with an offer to

sell

45 acres of undeveloped

southernmost end 0f the lake, as well as Elaine Warren’s house parcel

(approximately 1.29 acres). R. 1995-1996; EX. 11
right

all,

(COE

112-113).

Consistent With Stockton’s

of ﬁrst refusal, he was the ﬁrst potentially interested buyer that the Estate contacted. EX. 11

(COE

112-1 13); Tr. 513: 14-5 14: 1 5 (Stockton). Stockton declined the offer because he

felt that

the

asking price was too high. R. 1995-1996; Tr. 552:3-553:12 (Stockton); 78829-789212 (Finney)
3.

The Estate
agreement

lists

t0 sell

property for sale but
it

fails t0

reach a legally enforceable

t0 Tricore.

In July 2015, the Estate listed those 45 acres of frontage for sale through a real estate agent,

Teague Mullen, pursuant
Brinkmeyer purchased

it.

to a representation

R. 1995; EX. 13

agreement that excluded a brokers fee

(COE

118), EX. 201

(COE

52). In

if

Stockton or

October 2015, the

Estate and Tricore signed a purchase and sale agreement t0 sell the 45 acres t0 Tricore for $2

million. R. 1996; EX.

day

202 (COE 271-77); EX. 203 (278-83). The agreement granted Tricore a 45-

feasibility period within

which

t0 investigate

Tricore having an option t0 extend the period

refundable earnest money. R. 1997; EX. 204

whether the property could be developed, With

by another 45 days by paying $10,000

(COE

285). In late

December 2015, just

in

non-

a few days

before the feasibility period was set t0 expire, Tricore expressed concern to the Estate about the

1

Bill and Elaine Warren passed away in 1992 and 2003, respectively. R. 1995; Tr. 66:23-25, 96:3-5 (Dan Warren).
The Property was owned by their estate (i.e., the Estate) at the time of the sale to Stockton and Brinkmeyer. R. 1995.

impact ofthe wetlands on

its

ability t0

asked the Estate to extend the
refundable earnest

feasibility period for another

money deposit.

that request. R. 1997; Tr.

develop the property. R. 1997; Tr. 17329-19 (Mort). Tricore

EX. 206

(COE

313); Tr. 216: 1 1-20 (Mort).

its

The

217:13-22 (Mort); Tr. 800211-20 (Finney). Tricore

period expire Without posting the required earnest

by

45 days Without paying the non-

money

deposit,

Estate declined

let

the feasibility

and the agreement terminated

terms. R. 1997.

Tricore and the Estate continued t0 negotiate over the next several months, and Tricore

expressed an interest in purchasing the same 45 acres plus an additional 20 acres 0f lake frontage
to the

west (together, the “Property”). R. 1997-998;

t0 reserve for itself a portion

of lake frontage from the

At the end 0f June 2016, the
Agreement

for the purchase

1997; EX. 213

(COE

Tr. 15 1

parties signed

an

:

1

8-152:4 (Mort). The Estate requested

new 20-acre parcel.

Addendum

t0 the original

(COE

60). Closing

was scheduled

with an option for Tricore to extend the closing until October

7,

money. R. 1998; EX. 213 (COE 344

at

PSA,

11

6.0.).

First,

it

September

9,

2016,

Before signing the Tricore

790: 10-15 (Finney); Tr. 553:1-4, 574225-575: 19 (Stockton); see also EX. 8

PSA was

for

2016, by paying another $10,000

the Estate did not offer Stockton the option t0 purchase the Property

the Tricore

Purchase and Sale

0f the Property (collectively, the Tricore PSA) for $2.4 million. R.

329-45); EX. 29

in non-refundable earnest

Tr. 8 1 0: 10-19 (Finney).

0n those terms. See

(COE

Tr.

106). In addition,

legally unenforceable for at least three reasons.

violated the statute 0f frauds for lack of a precise description of the property

excluded from the

sale.

The Tricore PSA

called for Tricore to purchase the Property exceptfor

“not less than 200 feet 0f waterfront” reserved by the Estate, described as follows:

and retain from Parcel A and Buyer shall create
in compliance with Bonner County Planning and Zoning provisions
and approval, a parcel(s) in size not less than 200 feet 0f waterfront
(or two 100 foot parcels — consistent with the Buyer’s development)

The

Sellers reserve

adj acent to

R. 1998; EX. 213

feet

Tax 31 between

(COE 344

at

5).

11

N0

the existing access road and the lake.

further description 0r depiction 0f the “not less than

0f waterfront” was provided in the Tricore

not be determined. (See

dimensions 0f the “not
Q:

Mort conceded

id.).

less than

[I]sn’t

it

200

PSA

200

and, as a result, the exact dimensions could

that inescapable

problem When he testiﬁed

that the

0f waterfront” were uncertain and never determined:

feet

a fair statement that the exact dimensions 0f the real

property preserved and retained in paragraph 5 was never

determined?

A:

Iwould say

Q:

200 feet.
Okay. Now, so
as t0

yes, other than

it

suggests that

it’s

not less than

it would be uncertain
would be retained aside from the
could be n0 less than 200 feet? Is that a fair

is it

how much

fact that

it

a fair statement that

frontage

statement?

A:

it just depends 0n how the conﬁguration of the
development is. With the curvilinear nature 0fthe properly,
you could have 200 feet 0n the frontage and not have 200
feet 0n the roadway.

Well,

R. 589 (emphasis added); see also, R. 588 (“Q.

It

could be more than 200 feet pursuant t0 this

provision, correct? A. Correct”) (Mort).

Second, the Tricore

PSA

failed to provide the parties With

whether Tricore would actually take
of the

sale.

title t0

R. 1998; EX. 213

title

(COE 344

t0 the “not less than

at

1]

5).

200

any clear understanding of

feet

0f waterfront”

Tricore believed that the Tricore

be “transferred and transferred back,” and the Estate understood that

relinquish

title.

Tr. 260:1-261:1 (Mort); Tr.

785:1-787:4 (Finney).

More

at the

PSA
it

time

called for

would never

speciﬁcally, Tricore

believed that

it

would take

the 65 acres While the lots

Estate as

two ﬁnished

intended t0 relinquish

200

R. 1998; Tr. 259215-261

Tr.

785

:

8-787:4, 8 1 5

1

:

1

:1

(Mort).

The

Estate,

was a

title

by

back

rest

0f

t0 the

contrast, never

As Finney testiﬁed,

-817:7, 821 :4-14 (Finney).

a “transfer and transfer back” arrangement with a developer

Estate

0f waterfront” along with the

feet

were being platted and improved, and then transfer

lotsz.

title.

t0 the “not less than

title

risky proposition to

Which the

would never have agreed:
Q:

Did

the Estate always intend t0 retain

title

to that not-less-

than 200 feet?

A.

Yes.

Q:

Would you have allowed

A

N0. Based 0n

the Estate t0 transfer that not-less—

than 200 feet to Tricore?

my

experience,

conveyingproperly

t0

you ’re at t00 much ofa

a developer

risk

t0 then later get title back.

The developer could pledge the property for collateral that
you could lose it. The developer could not get through the
and could say, “Well, I don’t -- I can’t give
back, because I can’t get approval.” Or a developer

platting process

you

lots

might just refuse
involved in a

lot

is t0

deed them back in the

future. I’ve

been

0f litigation in those various circumstances.

make sure that you keep what you’re
keep it. Keep title t0 it, reserve it, retain it,

So the only way
keeping

t0

t0

exclude itfrom [the] conveyance.

Tr.

815:20-816:13 (emphasis added). Contrary t0 Tricore’s understanding, the Estate intended t0

retain title to the “not less than

200

feet

of waterfront” the entire time.

Tr. 785:22-787z5, 815:1-

817:7, 821 :4-14 (Finney).

Third, Tricore believed

2

it

was purchasing

Further demonstrating Tricore’s belief that

t0

deed the area back

to the Estate if Tricore

3 1 8 feet

more waterfront property than the

Estate

would be in title, Mort testiﬁed that he would need to ﬁgure out a way
had been unable to secure plat approval. Tr. 259: 15-26025.

it

believed

it

was

selling. R. 1998; Tr.

184:10-185222, 22029-221zl7 (Mort). Tricore’s conﬁlsion

clearly illustrated in Trial Exhibit 249,

throughout the

Which was displayed on an

easel in the courtroom

trial:
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Ex. 249

(COE 441).

Tricore thought that

hash marks labeled “1” and “2” when
220:9-221 17 (Mort).
:

Two months

it

later,

it

was purchasing

all

0f the frontage between the orange

signed the Tricore PSA.

foot stretch of waterfront

between “3” and “2.” R. 1998;

surpn'sed because he understood that Tricore

2

13, 222:

1

R. 1998; Tr. 184:10-185:22,

Tricore realized for the ﬁrst time that only the frontage

between “1” and “3” was included in the legal description, and

221

is

was buying

Tr.

a_ll

that

it

would

n_ot

receive the 3 1 8-

184210—185214 (Mort). Mort was

the waterfront property. Tr. 220:9-

8-23, 228:9-21 (Mort); Tr. 447: 15-22 (Mullen). Because the beachfront property

was

a crucial part of Tricore’s planned development, the disputed 318 feet represented a fundamental
difference of opinion With the Estate. Tr. 1106:15-1107217 (Lempesis). Losing that 318 feet of

beachfront drastically affected the overall performance of Tricore’s planned development. Tr.
22213-22329, 22628-22, 229210-13 (Mort); Ex. 224

(COE

366); see also Tr. 1066:1 1—1067:7

(Lempesis); Tr. 838218-22 (Finney). Tricore’s real estate broker, Teague Mullen, equated losing
the 3 1 8 feet t0 a $2.2 million loss for the planned development. Tr. 445: 17-23, 446: 17-23 (Mullen).

Mort described

As we

the confusion and

its

impact on Tricore in an email forwarded to Finney:

what was included in the
300’
waterfront land and the omission 0f the
plus 0r minus 0n the
east

discussed, With the confusion over

we

will lose

4

our development proforma.

lots in

I

know

this

was not

intentional by anyone however this drastically aﬂects the
I still
overallperformance 0fthepr0ject as we initially viewed it.
.

believe

it is

.

.

imperative t0 have all 0fthe balance 0fthe waterfront

included in the development With the County so there are n0 loose
ends 0r “remainder parcels” that could affect any development
decision.

EX. 224

(COE

366-367) (emphasis added). Mort then required signiﬁcant concessions from the

Estate t0 offset Tricore’s perceived “loss” 0f the 3 1 8 feet ofbeachfront. Tr. 222224-2239, 229: 10-

13 (Mort). Notably,

Mort acknowledged

should have — veriﬁed What

it

was purchasing before signing

sent out [sic] and actually surveyed and,

know, that was our bad.”

have — and by

that Tricore could

Tr. 185:20-22.

the Tricore

its

own

admission,

PSA: “We could have

you know, done everything, but we

didn’t.

And, you

(emphasis added).

In response t0 the parties’ failure to agree

on a material term

being purchased and sold), Tricore repudiated the Tricore

PSA by

(i.e.,

how much

refusing to

land was

move forward

without a renegotiation 0f the terms. R. 2000; Tr. 833:11-834215, 882:22-883:7 (Finney). Tricore
initially

demanded

that the Estate reduce the purchase price

from $2.4 million

to

$2 million or

agree t0 include “replacement” frontage in a different area 0f Priest Lake3. R. 1999-2000; EX. 253

(COE
need

3

818).

t0

On August

Tricore reiterated that for

it

to

move

forward, the Estate would either

reduce the purchase price 0r agree t0 include “replacement” frontage. R. 643; Tr. 829:8-

Mort demanded

worth at

5,

this price reduction

from $2.4 million

least $3.4 million. Tr. 209:13-19, 210221-21

1

:6

to

$2 million even though he believed that the Property was

(Mort).

21 (Finney); Tr. 1067:16-1068:1 (Lempesis). Finney testiﬁed, and the
Tricore’s attorney stated that the misunderstanding

meeting 0f the minds, and therefore, n0 deal;
price; or (3) the Estate

would have

t0 include

meant one 0f three

(2) the parties

court found, that

things: (1) there

would have

more waterfront

trial

to agree

in the sale.

R

was n0

on a reduced

1999; Tr. 821:18-

823224, 880:16-21, 1546: 23-15483 (Finney) (emphasis added). Finney’s contemporaneous

handwritten notes memorialized this conversation. See EX. 253
these statements had a distinct

meaning

doubt in his mind” that they amounted

On August

9,

Finney that “the only

t0

him

(COE

818). Finney testiﬁed that

as an experienced attorney,

t0 a repudiation.

and

that

he had “n0

Tr. 832:1 1-833:10.4

Tricore’s attorney again said the phrase “n0 meeting 0f the minds” and told

way

that the matter

would g0 forward would be

either a reduction in price

0r additional footage 0r other concessions.” Tr. 829:8-21 (Finney); see also Tr. 87225-87328,

875:24-876215, 879:14-22 (Finney); Tr. 1065:10-1068:1, 1115:2-14 (Lempesis). At this point,

Finney was certain that there was n0 contract and that Tricore and the Estate “were moving forward
with negotiations t0 try t0 reach a new agreement.” Tr. 82922-833110, 1549: 19-1550: 10 (Finney).
In Finney’s mind, there

was no doubt

that Tricore

had repudiated the Tricore PSA.

Tr. 83324-10,

87225-873223, 87724-87828, 1577:3-1578:5 (Finney). This conclusion was reasonable in light 0f
the fact that Tricore admitted that

it

employed a negotiation

tactic that

it

referred to as “the fear 0f

not closing.” Tr. 252:4-7, 252:23-253:1, 253221-24 (Mort). Tricore acknowledged that

4

it

worked

Co-personal representative Chris Warren, While less involved in the day-to-day discussions, likewise understood that

-- I thought that the deal With Tricore was done. That’s
Why we
Mr. Stockton.”); Tr. 494: 12-16 (“Q: What were the other reasons Why you were comfortable in selling it t0
Mr. Stockton and Mr. Brinkmeyer? A: Because I didn’t think we had a deal With Tricore.”)

Tricore had repudiated. See Tr. 473214-18 (“I don’t
sold

it

to

10

make

hard to

the Estate believe that the deal 0f was off and that

it

did everything

it

could t0 be “as

convincing as possible” about not closing. Tr. 249:25-250:3 (Mort).

Over the next month 0r
10, 87225-873223,

price; (2) the transfer

all

worth

it

needed

its

at least

in order t0

move

224 (COE 366-67);
that

Dan Warren’s

at least

new terms.

Tricore repeated

$100,000, along

were not included

its

demand

stated: “Cliff’s counter is 2.25

2002; EX. 44

September

knew

for concessions

(COE

t0

The water system and

PSA. EX. 213 (COE 329-

PSA

and a proposal for a new

on August 19 and again on August

(COE

265. Tr.

821); R. 2001; Tr. 837212-24, Tr. 1558:9-155926

and a dollar a yard for

6, Tricore’s

that the Estate

n0 cost

in the Tricore

(Finney). Tricore’s attorney followed those with a September

On

pit, at

R. 2000, Tr. 833:11-834:15, 882:22-88327, 1552: 1-1553219 (Finney).

1553:20-1554225 (Finney); EX. 253

t0 meet. [sic]” R.

gravel

Tr. 835:3-837:7 (Finney).

Finney Viewed the email as written repudiation 0f the Tricore

Tricore

its

forward: (1) a $300,000 reduction in purchase

$480,000 from co-personal representative

were brand-new terms

contract with

was

Tr. 833:4-

water rights to the property; and (3) a grant 0f up t0 160,000 cubic yards of ﬁll material

ﬁll material

5

PSA.

repudiation of the Tricore

0f a private water system owned by the Estate worth

Tricore. R. 1999—2000; EX.

45).

repeated

877:4-878:8 (Finney). In an email dated August 16, 2016, Tricore outlined

“ﬁnal analysis” 0f what

with

so, Tricore

dirt.

1

text

message

t0

Finney which

This could g0 south. Are you available

167).

attorney reiterated the required concessions: “Let’s d0 that

took out a private loan to pay off several years 0f back taxes, and

knew

it

knew

that the loan

was two years
behind on property taxes to Bonner County and quickly needed to pay $50,000 to avoid a tax foreclosure. Tr. 247 1921 (Mort); Tr. 7 14:20-71629, 759: 12-21, 833:1-4, 838223-8405 (Finney). Finney testiﬁed that Tricore was using these
ﬁnancial pressures to its advantage in demanding concessions. Tr. 714220-716z9, 759: 12-21, 83321-4, 83823-8405.
in default. Tr. 247: 19-24829 (Mort); Tr. 874: 13-875:6 (Finney). Tricore also

that the Estate

:

11

[$2.25 million], reduce the price 0fthe dirt t0 a buck, and be done.” EX. 44

(COE

167); Tr. 1122:9-

12 (Lempesis). Later that afternoon, Tricore’s attorney followed up by email:

John since were having trouble moving

would propose that we extend the dropdead
December 20. Mort would agree t0 pay another

due to our schedules,
ﬁnal deadline t0

I

$50,000 refundable Ernest money
part 0f the price.

or so. Since there

propose that

this

is

We

would go hard once we
water system, dirt, and What

[sic] that

can work out the pending details on the

may be

ﬁnish line

this thing to the

can probably d0 that in the next week

another payment due 0n October

$50,000 be in Lou 0f that

[sic]. If that

9, I

works

would
let

me

know ASAP[.]
EX. 50

(COE

219); Tr. 1081:20-1084:3 (Lempesis).

Ex. 51

(COE

220); Tr. 842:14-843219 (Finney).

The Estate

4.

enters into a purchase

The Estate declined

and

sale

Tricore’s ﬁnal demand.

agreement With Stockton and

Brinkmeyer.
In

mid—August 2016

in the process

totality

new

a neighborhood meeting, Stockton discovered that the Estate

was

of selling the Property Without honoring his right of ﬁrst refusal t0 purchase the

of the approximate 65 acres in question6. R. 2000; Tr. 506213-5073, 515:19-25, 572211-

573:12 (Stockton)
the

at

He contacted co-personal representative

Chris Warren, expressed his interest in

65-acre offering pursuant to his right 0f ﬁrst refusal, and

was

told t0 speak With Finney.

R. 2001; Tr. 572:1 1-573212, 574215-575zl6, Tr. 575:20-57621 (Stockton). Stockton asked Finney
if there

6

was a

contract to sell the property, but Finney did not divulge very

much. R. 2001;

Tr.

to sell Stockton the original 45 acres in 2014 (along With Elaine Warren’s house
which he declined, that offer was not for the full 65 acres and did not include the 20-acre parcel to the west
included in the 2016 Tricore PSA. R 2001; Tr. 575:17-19 (Stockton).

Although the Estate had offered

parcel)

12

577 13-57828 (Stockton). At
:

Tricore

PSA t0
On

trial,

Finney explained that the Estate was not willing

t0 provide the

Stockton. Tr. 76724-12 (Finney).

September

2,

Finney, co-personal representatives Chris and

and Stockton’s legal counsel met; Stockton participated

in the

Dan Warren, Brinkmeyer,

meeting by phone. R. 2003;

Tr.

675214-20, Tr. 67628-15 (Brinkmeyer); Tr. 856:1-4 (Finney). For the ﬁrst time, Finney informed

Stockton and Brinkmeyer that the Estate had entered into a contract With Tricore to
Property. Tr. 620217-24, 67829-22 (Brinkmeyer); see also EX. 8
(Finney). Finney

that the Tricore

wanted them

PSA was n0

t0 believe that Tricore

was buying

(COE

sell the

106); Tr. 855219-856225

the Property, despite his belief

longer valid 0r operational, reasoning that:

someone else was buying it, why wouldn’t they
revert back and not buy it. ... [I]t would be much better for them to
have the Estate own it and have t0 pay taxes than them buy it. So
If they didn’t think

whatever information they had, whatever
whatever concern they had, it was ﬁne with
Tr.

85429-16 (Finney). Letting Stockton and Brinkmeyer believe the Property was under contract,

even when

pay

conception they had,

me that they had that.

it

wasn’t, “was the only

that debt for taxes

way to

and the loan

that

serve the

Warren Estate

had paid taxes.”

Tr.

to get

some property

sold and

854:20-22 (Finney). For that reason,

Finney did not tell Stockton and Brinkmeyer that Tricore had repudiated the agreement. Tr. 744:324, 745:21-746:1, 85423-6 (Finney).

Before agreeing t0

sell

the Property, the Estate asked for indemniﬁcation. Tr. 632:7-63323,

68222-19 (Brinkmeyer). The parties negotiated and executed a “Real Estate Sale Indemniﬁcation

Agreement”

(the

“Indemniﬁcation Agreement”). R. 2003; EX. 8 (106-109)). In

disclosed the existence of the Tricore

PSA

and

its

13

it,

the Estate

$2.4 million purchase price, R. 2003; EX. 8

(COE

106),

that

failed t0

it

and represented

that “Stockton

purchasers, and that

it

would repudiate

and Brinkmeyer agreed

claim by Tricore or any entity

The

valid and enforceable right 0f ﬁrst refusal,”

honor Stockton’s ﬁrst right 0f refusal before entering into the Tricore PSA,

Stockton’s right t0 purchase the Property

106). Stockton

owns a

its

to

was superior

t0 Tricore

obligations under the Tricore

and

that

other prospective

all

PSA. R. 2003; EX.

8

(COE

defend and indemnify the Estate up t0 $100,000 0n any

owned by Mort.

R. 2003; EX. 8

(COE 106-107

Estate ultimately agreed t0 sell Stockton and Brinkmeyer

at

ﬂ

1).

most 0fthe Property

for $2.5

million under a Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement (the Stockton PSA). R. 2003; EX. 2

(COE
16,

92—97); Tr. 88:13-21

(Dan Warren);

Tr. 74128-14,

743210-17 (Finney); see also Tr. 740:8—

84214-13 (Finney). Like the Tricore PSA, the Stockton

two parcels 0f not

less than

200

feet

PSA

included a reservation for one 0r

of waterfront:

compliance with the Bonner County Planning
and Zoning provisions, a parcel(s) in size not less than 200 feet 0f
waterfront (or two 100 foot parcels—at Sellers’ sole discretion)
Sellers shall create in

adj acent to

EX. 2

(COE

92).

Tax 31 between

the existing access road and the lake.

But unlike the Tricore PSA,

the property lines of the reservation

in the Stockton

September

6,

acknowledged

Id.

(COE

95

at

ﬂ

8).

Stockton and Brinkmeyer Closed on the Property With

title

vesting in

PLBM LLC (PLBM), a limited liability company owned by Stockton7. R. 2004; EX. 7 (COE
101,

7

104-105); Tr. 533:23-535219 (Stockton).

Stockton and

that

were based 0n the Estate’s “best knowledge” and were not

warranted unless “based upon an actual survey.”

On

PSA the parties

PLBM will be collectively referred to

The

Estate used the proceeds t0

as “Stockton” unless otherwise indicated.

14

100-

pay off the

outstanding loan and back taxes. Ex. 7

(COE

100).

Stockton and Brinkmeyer weren’t aware that Tricore’s closing date was September 7

because Finney never told them. Tr. 766:14-767z3, 1560:19-1561:1 (Finney); Tr. 685218-686zl,
709: 14-23 (Brinkmeyer). Finney had not

than the

name and

the price that

was

made any

representations about the Tricore

(COE

of ﬁrst refusal 0r that

their

No

PSA until after

834); Tr. 777:3-778213, 85524-18 (Finney).

Finney believed the entire transaction was lawful and appropriate.

So did Stockton and Brinkmeyer.

other

inserted into the Indemniﬁcation Agreement. Tr. 1560:19-

1561 :1 (Finney). Finney didn’t provide Stockton and Brinkmeyer With the Tricore
they closed on the Property. EX. 58

PSA

one ever told them

Tr. 865:2-11 (Finney).

that Stockton did not

have a valid right

purchase 0f the Property was inappropriate, improper, 0r unlawﬁll. Tr.

578225-579z8 (Stockton); Tr. 66822-5, 682220-24, 683218-68428, 686:25-687:6 (Brinkmeyer); Tr.
864:4-19 (Finney).

22 (Stockton);

Tr.

Had someone done

so,

they would not have bought the Property. Tr. 579218-

682220-6832 (Brinkmeyer).

Later, the Estate

had a metes and bounds

legal description prepared to clarify the “not less

785:8- 1 7 (Finney). The Estate recorded a warranty

than 200 feet ofwaterfront.” Tr. 782: 16-783 :1

1,

deed With the legal description and granted

PLBM

an

Amended

Personal Representative

Deed

using that description to clarify the reservation in the Stockton PSA. Tr. 783:19-78422, 1584:5-18
(Finney); EX. 81

(COE

961).

Finney emailed Tricore’s attorney 0n September
concerns for Tricore and the Warren Estate ﬁnds
different direction.” EX. 51

(COE

6, stating, “[t]here are several

itself in a situation requiring

220). Finney also returned Tricore’s earnest

15

it

to

unresolved

proceed in a

money

deposit. Id.

5.

Tricore ﬁles suit against the Estate,

PLBM,

Stockton, and Brinkmeyer.

Tricore responded to the sale 0f the Property t0 Brinkmeyer and Stockton
current matter against the Estate. R. 24. Tricore

Stockton, and Brinkmeyer. R. 74. Tricore’s

amended

its

complaint to also

amended complaint

by ﬁling the

name PLBM,

asserted claims for speciﬁc

performance 0f the Tricore PSA, and monetary damages based upon theories 0f breach 0f contract

and the duty 0f good

faith

and

fair dealing, Violation

0f the ICPA,

civil conspiracy, fraud,

negligence and tortious interferences. R. 77-8 1. Each Defendant denied the claims. R.67, 150, 158.

6.

The

Stockton,

parties ﬁle cross-motions for

PLBM,

summary judgment.

Brinkmeyer, and the Estate

moved

for

summary judgment

Tricore’s claims. R. 165, 452. Tricore ﬁled a cross—motion for partial

to dismiss

summary judgment 0n

its

breach 0f contract Claims and t0 dismiss a number 0f afﬁrmative defenses. R. 279, 449. Following

brieﬁng and oral argument, the

trial

for Summary Judgment, which:

(a)

court entered a Memorandum Decision

and Order 0n Motions

denied Tricore’s motion to enter judgment on

its

breach of

contract claim, (b) granted Tricore’s motion t0 dismiss several afﬁrmative defenses, (c) denied

Stockton,

8

PLBM, Brinkmeyer and

the Estate’s motions t0 dismiss Tricore’s claims for tortious

tort, Tricore’s owner offered n0 testimony to establish the
Mort admitted that he has never had any personal interaction With Stockton. Tr. 302: 14-16
(Mort) He further testiﬁed that he was not aware of Stockton harboring any bias, animus, or ill-Will toward him or
Tricore. Tr.302: 1 7-24 (Mort). He was not aware 0f any wrongful 0r improper intent that Stockton might have harbored
0r acted upon as it relates t0 himself 0r Tricore. Tr. 303:4-9 (Mort). He was similarly not aware 0f any wrongful or
improper intent that PLBM might have harbored 0r acted upon as it relates t0 himself 0r Tricore. Tr. 303:10-14
(Mort). Finally, he was likewise unaware 0f any wrongful 0r improper intent that Brinkmeyer may have harbored 0r
acted upon. Tr. 347:9-348:6 (Mort). The bottom line is that Mort testiﬁed that he was unaware 0f any wrongful conduct
whatsoever. Id. (testifying that his complaint against Stockton and Brinkmeyer was that they had bought the property
he wanted, but otherwise had no complaints about independent wrongdoing, intent, means, methods or purposes
employed by Stockton or Brinkmeyer).

Despite suing Stockton and Brinkmeyer individually in

requisite tortious intent.

16

interference, civil conspiracy, fraud,

granted Stockton,

PLBM,

trial

to

PLBM, Brinkmeyer and

however, the

rule. Id.

court granted Tricore’s motion t0 dismiss

trial

(Sept. 7, 2018); R. 1220, 1227, 1249-1261.

is

not Whether the

Parcel A, but whether
in this case, Parcels

The

7.

The

parties

The

trial

PSA

A, B.

all

was

afﬁrmative defenses

uncertain. See Tr. 10

court incorrectly held that “the determinative

[sic]

[sic]

contains an adequate description 0f the real property t0 be sold,

and C.” R. 1249-1261.

parties proceed t0 trial.

proceeded t0 a court

Court Trial on February

8,

trial,

the

trial

trial

before the Honorable Barbara Buchanan on the

court entered a

Memorandum

Decision and Order re:

2019. R. 1991-2025. Based on ﬁndings that the Estate breached the

contract and the covenant 0f

good

faith

and

fair

dealing and violated the ICPA, that

Stockton, and Brinkmeyer tortiously interfered With the contract, and that
in a civil conspiracy, the trial court ordered speciﬁc

conveyance 0f the Property from

and costs

summary

PSA contains the precise dimensions of the parcel(s) t0 be carved out from

remaining claims. Following

engaged

(d)

Upon motion for reconsideration by

related t0 the statute of frauds, even though the property description

issue

and

Stockton). R. 1209-1218.

court initially declined t0 decide issues related t0 the statute 0f frauds at

judgment by erroneously applying the parol evidence
all parties,

t0 the Estate),

Brinkmeyer, and the Estate’s motions t0 dismiss Tricore’s negligence

and ICPA claims (with respect

The

and Violation of the ICPA (with respect

t0 Tricore

Id.

PLBM to Tricore for the sum of $2.4 million,

On March

21, 2019, the Estate,

17

Defendants had

performance of the Tricore PSA,

and against the Appellants, jointly and severally,

determined. See generally

all

PLBM,

PLBM,

in

and attorney fees

an amount t0 be

later

Stockton, and Brinkmeyer

appealed. R. 2261, 2272.

The

8.

trial

On April

by

2019, Tricore cross—appealed. R. 2302.

court awards Tricore attorney fees and costs.

Thereafter, Tricore

incurred

10,

three separate

moved

for an

award of attorney

fees

and costs totaling $529,431.11

law ﬁrms, including attorney fees expended for Tricore’s

attorney for initially negotiating the contract in question. R. 2069. Tricore based

the Estate

on the Tricore PSA, Idaho Code

Consumer Protection
0n the

trial

court’s

Act. R. 2037.

ﬁnding

for Tricore’s attorney fees

As

that they

and

its

and Idaho Code

§

request against

48-608(5) of the Idaho

against Stockton, Brinkmeyer, and

PLBM,

Tricore relied

were each jointly and severally responsible with the Estate

costs. R.

2024. Stockton, Brinkmeyer and the Estate opposed

was no

legal basis for an attorney fee award, that Tricore

had

request for attorney fees With respect t0 the claims, and that

— in

Tricore’s motion, arguing that there

not appropriately apportioned

§ 12-120(3),

its

real estate

any case — no attorney fees were awardable for non-trial attorney work. R. 2258, 2261.
In April 2019, the trial court issued a

$494,431.11 against

all

memorandum

decision and order awarding Tricore

Defendants, jointly and severally. R. 2307-2319. In

decision and order, and in an attempt to correct clear deﬁciencies raised

and prior brieﬁng, the

trial

ﬁndings with respect to

civil conspiracy.

by

memorandum

its

the notices 0f appeal

court attempted a belated post-appeal clariﬁcation of

awarding attorney fees against

all

R. 231

1.

The

trial

its

factual

court back peddled on the basis for

Defendants 0n a joint and several basis.

attempted to clarify that the basis for awarding fees was not the ﬁnding of a

Id.

The

civil

trial

court

conspiracy 0r

the ﬁnding 0f tortious interference (as previously stated), but that because of the civil conspiracy

ﬁnding,

PLBM,

Stockton, and Brinkmeyer were liable for the Estate’s breaches 0f contract and
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Violation 0f the

2313.

On May

ICPA, and thus jointly and severally
29, 2019, the Estate,

PLBM,

liable for Tricore’s attorney fees. R.

Stockton, and Brinkmeyer ﬁled

amended

2311-

notices 0f

appeal. R. 2437, 2449.

ISSUES PRESENTED

II.

A.

by granting
B.

Did

the

Tricore’s

Did

court err

trial

by denying

ON APPEAL

the Appellants’

summary judgment motion and

summary judgment which dismissed Appellants’

the

statute

court err in entering judgment for Tricore

trial

0n

0f frauds defenses?
its

claims against

Appellants and entering judgment in favor 0f Tricore?
C.

Did

the

trial

court err in ordering that Tricore

entitled t0 attorneys’ fees

and

and on a joint and several basis?

costs against all Appellants,

III.

The

was

ATTORNEYS’ FEES ON APPEAL

Estate respectfully requests that this Court

award

it

reasonable attorney fees and costs

0n appeal under Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3) and 12-107.

ARGUMENT

IV.

Standards 0f Review.

A.

Summary Judgment.
standard of review

is

the

In an appeal from an order 0f

same

employed by the

as the standard

C0. ofldaho, 138 Idaho 443, 445, 65 P.3d 184, 186 (2003).
the pleadings, depositions, and admissions

there

is

no genuine issue

as a matter of law. Id.

as to

any material

on

trial court.

Purdy

Summary judgment

v.

is

this Court's

Farmers

and

that the

moving party

is

show

that

entitled t0 a judgment

the initial burden of showing that

19

Ins.

appropriate if

ﬁle, together With the afﬁdavits, if any,

fact

The moving party bears

summary judgment,

no genuine issues

0f material

fact exist.

Thomson

1038 (1994). The burden then
the evidence submitted

fact.

Id. If

Which

this

there are

by

the

v.

Idaho

Agency, Ina, 126 Idaho 527, 531, 887 P.2d 1034,

Ins.

non-moving party

shifts t0 the

moving party and

establishes the existence of a material issue 0f

n0 disputed issues of material

fact,

Court exercises free review. Purdy, 138 Idaho

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

ﬁndings of fact

if supported

by

substantial

t0 provide evidence that contradicts

On

then only questions of law remain over
at

445, 65 P.3d at 186.

a decision after

and competent evidence.

trial, this

Cliﬁ’v.

950, 952, 895 P.2d 551, 553 (1995). However, this Court freely draws
the facts presented. Id.

Finally,

when

contract terms are questions 0f law

its

Court Will uphold

Bonner

own

Cy.,

126 Idaho

conclusions from

considering contracts, “the legal meaning and effect 0f

which

[the Court]

reviews freely.” Holscher

v.

James, 124

Idaho 443, 447, 860 P.2d 646, 650 (1993).
Evidentiarv Rulings,

Award of Attorney

the Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion

of whether the

trial court: (1)

Fees, and

by a trial

Amount 0f Supersedeas B0nd9. When

court, the inquiry requires consideration

correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within

the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable t0
the speciﬁc choices available to

Lunneborg

9

v.

My Fun Life,

it;

and

(4)

reached

its

decision by the exercise of reason.

163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).

Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 35(h), Stockton adopts by reference the following part from the Brief of Appellant
IV. (trial court abused its discretion setting the amount of the supersedeas bond).

Todd Brinkmeyer:
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bV Denving the Estate, PLBM, Stockton, and Brinkmever’s
Motion for Summarv Judgment and bV Granting Tricore’s Motion for Summarv
Judgment (Upon Reconsideration) On All Issues Related t0 the Statute of Frauds.

The

B.

Trial Court Erred

The Tricore
of frauds because

200

feet

it

PSA is not an enforceable
fails to

contract.

As

discussed below,

it

violates the statute

describe with sufﬁcient precision the boundaries 0f the “not less than

0f waterfront” reserved by the Estate. Given that the boundaries of the reserved frontage

cannot be “pinpointed with exactitude” as the statute 0f frauds requires, the Tricore

PSA

is

not

enforceable.

The

statute

0f frauds requires real estate purchase and sale agreements t0 be in writing.

LC. §§ 9-503, 9-505. To comply with the
description of the property t0 be sold.

possible for

v.

someone

to identify exactly

statute

0f frauds, an agreement must contain a precise

The description must “describe
what property the

seller is

the property so that

it is

t0 the buyer.”

Ray

conveying

Frasure, 146 Idaho 625, 629, 200 P.3d 1174, 1178 (2009) (emphasis added). In other words, the

boundaries ofthe property must be “pinpointed with exactitude.” Hilbert v. Hough, 132 Idaho 203,
206, 969 P.2d 836, 838-39 (1998); see also Bauchman-Kingston P’ship,

LP

v.

Haroldsen, 149

Idaho 87, 91, 233 P.3d 18, 22 (2008). “Agreements for the sale ofreal property that

fail t0

comply

With the statute of frauds are unenforceable for obtaining speciﬁc performance 0r damages.”

Bauchman-Kingston P’ship, LP, 149 Idaho

The “exactness” requirement

at 91,

is strictly

233 P.3d

enforced.

the precise boundaries 0f the property from the writing

at 22.

If a

itself,

reviewing court cannot determine

Without resorting to parol evidence,

the agreement violates the statute of frauds and will not be enforced. Ray, 146 Idaho at 628,

P.3d at

1

177.

200

As this Court recently emphasized, reviewing a property description under the statute

21

0f frauds

is

an “objective determination that

is

not affected by the understanding 0r intention 0f

the contracting parties at the time they drafted the property description.”

Trust

David and Marvel Benton

McCarty, 161 Idaho 145, 151, 384 P.3d 392, 398 (2016). The question

v.

parties intended, but

whether the description they reduced

t0 writing is precise

is

not what the

enough

to enable

the court t0 “fashion a decree for speciﬁc performance.” Bauchman-Kingston, 149 Idaho at 92,

233 P.3

at 23.

Idaho Courts routinely refuse to enforce agreements that do not meet

this exacting

standard“).

The property description

in the Tricore

PSA falls far short 0f the “exactness” requirement.

Tricore and the Estate unquestionably failed t0 adequately describe the area to be retained

Estate as required

by Idaho

The
in

law:

Sellers reserve

and retain from Parcel

(0r

(COE 344

in size

two 100 foot parcels

adjacent to

at

See,

e.g.,

—

Tax 31 between

not less than 200feet of waterfront

consistent with Buyer’s development)
the existing access road and the lake.

ﬂ 5)(emphasis added). The phrase “not

that description does not allow the exact

1°

A and Buyer shall create

compliance With Bonner County Planning and Zoning provisions

and approval, a parce1(s)

EX. 213

by the

Ray, 146 Idaho

at

630

less than

200

feet

0f waterfront” in

dimensions of the property reserved by the Estate to be

(listing physical

address not sufﬁciently exact); David

and Marvel Benton

Trust,

161 Idaho at 154 (listing physical address and referencing landmarks not sufﬁciently exact); White v. Rehn, 103 Idaho
1, 3 (1982) (“all land west 0f road running south to the Rehn farmstead containing 960 acres” not sufﬁciently exact);

Bauchman-Kingston, 149 Idaho at 90-92 (describing 4.9 acres consisting 0f “residence and outbuildings located [at]
3359 N 5 WEST” not sufﬁciently exact); Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430, 434, 80 P.3d 1031 (2003) (referring t0
acreage listed on property tax assessment notices not sufﬁciently exact); Watson v. Watson, 144 Idaho 214, 217, 159
P.3d 851, 855 (2007) (ﬁnding contract for sale 0f 1 14 acres could not be speciﬁcally performed because there was n0
reasonably clear property description 0f a retained ﬁve-acre parcel); Lexington Heights Dev., LLC v. Crandlemire,
140 Idaho 276, 281-283, 92 P.3d 526, 531-33 (2004) (ﬁnding legal description in agreement did not contain a
sufﬁcient legal description 0f the property to be sold “because it does not contain any description sufﬁcient to identify
the approximate ﬁve-acre parcel that is to be excluded from the sale.”).

22

determined. Mort conceded this inescapable problem

when he

testiﬁed that the dimensions 0f the

“not less than 200 feet 0f waterfront” were uncertain, were never determined, and could be longer
than 200 feet based on the curvilinear nature of the Property. R. 588-589.

As

a result,

impossible to ascertain the location of the eastern boundary which could be 200 feet to the

205

feet to the east,

215

feet to the east, etc.

the reserved area could be

to

drawn

was

it

east,

Furthermore, the western and eastern boundaries 0f

in different conﬁgurations: they could

be drawn to run parallel

each other, thus forming a rectangle-shaped parcel, 0r to gradually veer apart as they run t0 the

south, thus forming a trapezoid-shaped parcel.“

LLC v.

This Court’s decision in Lexington Heights Dev.,

92 P.3d 526, 531 (2004),

The agreement

is

dispositive

on

in that case involved a sale

this point

and

its

facts are nearly identical to this case.

of bulk property t0 a developer. Like the Estate in

case, the seller reserved a small portion of the property for itself.

seller

would

retain

Crandlemier, 140 Idaho 276, 281

The agreement speciﬁed that the

“no more than ﬁve acres” encompassing the

volleyball court, and

swimming

seller’s house, tennis court,

pool. Lexington Heights, 140 Idaho at 278, 92 P.3d at 528.

agreement further provided that the

seller

would have
The

the reserved area surveyed and

Id.

promised, but the parties never appended

t0 the written agreement. Id. at 279.

2W

it

200’

200'
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The

would

prepared the legal description as

prepare a legal description prior t0 closing.

seller

this

The

seller

eventually sold the property t0 a different buyer, which led t0 the developer bringing an action for

speciﬁc performance. This Court refused t0 enforce the agreement, holding that
statute

As

of frauds for lack of an exact description of the area reserved by the

violated the

Id. at

281-82.

relevant here, the Court reasoned that the parties were perfectly capable of identifying the

reserved area by a legal description.
that the developer

of the land

it

had never agreed

was purchasing.”

agreement under the

statute

Lexington Heights
Tricore

200

seller.

it

is

PSA used a general

feet

Id.

Id. at

t0 “the precise size, location,

As

0f frauds.
directly

282. However, the fact that they did not d0 so meant

a result, the developer

dimensions and conﬁguration”

was precluded from enforcing

Id.

on

point.

Like the unenforceable agreement in that case, the

description 0f the property t0 be reserved

0f waterfront.” The legal description contained in the Tricore

under the holding in Lexington Heights because there
dimensions and conﬁguration” 0f the “not

Mort conceded,
longer than 200

less than

the dimensions and conﬁguration

feet.

the

is

200

n0 way
feet

t0

by

the seller: “not less than

PSA is patently inadequate

determine the “size, location,

0f waterfront.” See

Id. at

278.

As

were uncertain, never determined, and could be

R. 588-599. Language that

is

open-ended with respect

to the

amount of

property being sold (or in this case, reserved by the seller) does not “pinpoint With exactitude”

What land
223 P.3

will be transferred as required

at 22. Just as in

by Idaho law. See Bauchman-Kingston, 149 Idaho

at 91,

Lexington Heights, the parties used a general description 0f the reserved

12
The Court also refused t0 100k t0 the legal description that the sellers prepared after the agreement was executed.
Because the legal description was not included within agreement, the Court held, it was parol evidence that could not
be considered. Id. at 282.
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area,

knowing

that the exact boundaries

exact dimensions open

precisely

is

0f ﬁve acres, “the precise

would need

What the

size,

statute

location,

to

be determined

later.

0f frauds forbids. See

R. 588-589. Leaving

Id. (seller’s reservation

dimensions and conﬁguration

[t0

mutually

be]

determined,” violated statute 0f frauds); see also Hilbert, 132 Idaho at 206, 969 P.2d at 839

(agreement t0 decide 0n “exact boundaries” after obtaining survey violated statute 0f frauds).

The
at the

trial

court initially declined to decide issues related to the insufﬁcient legal description

summary judgment

stage. R.

Upon

1209-18.

reconsideration, however, the trial court

erroneously granted Tricore’s motion t0 summarily dismiss the Estate’s statute 0f frauds

afﬁrmative defense. R. 1249-1261. Ignoring the great weight 0f legal precedent, particularly this
Court’s holding in Lexington Heights, the

is

not Whether the

PSA

Parcel A, but whether
in this case, Parcels

The

trial

trial

court incorrectly held that “the determinative issue

contains the precise dimensions 0f the parce1(s) t0 be carved out from

PSA

A, B.

[sic]

[sic]

contains an adequate description 0f the real property to be sold,

and C.” R. 1257.

court’s ruling that the Tricore

PSA was

adequate legal descriptions for Parcels A, B, and

dimensions or location of the “not

less than

200

feet

C —

enforceable as long as
despite not

knowing

it

contained

the exact size,

0f waterfront” reserved by the Estate — cannot

be reconciled with the ultimate holding in Lexington Heights: “[t]he legal description in the

Agreement does not contain a sufﬁcient description of the property

to

contain any description sufﬁcient t0 identify the ﬁve-acre parcel that
sale.”

Lexington Heights, 140 Idaho

at

be sold because
is

t0

it

does not

be excluded from the

278, 92 P.3d at 528. Applied to the facts 0f this case, the

ultimate holding in Lexington Heights reads as follows: “[t]he legal description in the agreement
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does not contain a sufﬁcient description of the property to be sold because

it

does not contain any

description sufﬁcient t0 identify the [“noz‘ less than 200feet ofwateiy’ront”] that

from the

sale.”

The holding

violates the statute of frauds

in

and

Lexington Heights
is

is

t0

is

be excluded

dispositive and, as such, the Tricore

PSA

unenforceable.

In sum, the trial court erred

by granting Tricore’s motion

issues related to the statute of frauds

for

summary judgment 0n

all

and by denying Stockton, Brinkmeyer, and the Estate’s

motions for summary judgment.
C.

The

Trial Court Erred in Entering

Judgment

in

Favor 0f Tricore and Against the
Was N0 Meeting 0f the Minds 0n

Estate 0n Tricore’s Contract Claims Because There

Two Material Terms.
As

set forth

below, evidence

at trial clearly established that there

was no meeting 0f the

minds between Tricore and the Estate 0n two material terms 0f the Tricore PSA:
318-foot section 0f beachfront was part of the purchase and sale; and (2) whether
less than

200

feet

to Tricore for

253

(COE

title

whether a
t0 the “not

0f waterfront” would always remain vested in the Estate, or would be transferred

development and then transferred back

818). Thus,

1.

(1)

to the Estate as

n0 contract was formed and the Tricore

ﬁnished

lots.

R. 1999; EX.

PSA is void.

There was n0 meeting 0f the minds 0n whether the agreement included 318
feet 0f frontage.

The

trial

court erroneously entered judgment against the Estate and in favor of Tricore

the issues of Whether the Tricore

breached the Tricore
trial

on

PSA was an enforceable contract and whether the Estate’s actions

PSA and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

court erroneously ignored that the Tricore

In so doing, the

PSA was void because there was n0 meeting 0f the
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minds between the

parties. R.

2005-2007. The evidence

and the

at trial,

trial

court’s

own ﬁndings

0f fact, prove that there was n0 meeting of the minds 0n Whether 3 1 8 feet 0f frontage was included
in the purchase

and

sale, material

PSA void.

terms that rendered the Tricore

Formation 0f a valid contract requires a meeting of the minds on
Ward, 147 Idaho 509, 512, 211 P.3d 118, 121 (2009); Barry

v.

all

material terms. Justad

Pac. W. C0nst., Ina, 140 Idaho

v.

827, 831, 103 P.3d 440, 443 (2004). In a real estate purchase and sale agreement, the amount of

land t0 be sold

is

a material term. Brothers

For a valid contract

0n

that term.

t0

Arave, 67 Idaho 171, 176, 174 P.2d 202, 205 (1946).

be formed, the parties must reach a “distinct and

P.O. Ventures, Inc.

P.3d 870, 875 (2007).

v.

v.

Loucks Family Irrevocable

Failure to reach a distinct and

common

land t0 be sold renders the agreement unenforceable.

agreement bears the burden ofproving that a
Tricore’s testimony at

trial

distinct

established that

it

and

Id.

Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 238, 159

understanding 0n the amount of

The party seeking

believed the Tricore

The

:

8 1 6: 13 (Finney).

was not included

Arave, 67 Idaho

at 176,

174 P.2d

at

Because the parties did not reach a

Id.

PSA included a 3 1 8-foot

Estate,

0n the other hand,

in the Tricore

The amount of land t0 be conveyed under the Tricore

PSA.

Tr. 8 1 5 :20-

PSA is a material term and

common understanding” 0n that term.

Tricore and the Estate must reach a “distinct and

v.

t0 enforce the

common understanding was reached.

section 0f waterfront. Tr. 184: 10-185z22, 220:9-221 17 (Mort).
correctly believed that this section 0f waterfront

common understanding”

Brothers

205; P.O. Ventures, Ina, 144 Idaho at 238, 158 P.3d at 875.

distinct

and

common

understanding 0n the amount of land

conveyed under the Tricore PSA, there was n0 meeting of the minds and the Tricore

The Restatement (Second) ofContracz‘s

§

20(1)
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is

directly

on point.

It

PSA is void.

provides, in relevant

part, that a contract fails for lack

0f mutual assent

(i.e.,

n0 meeting of the minds) when the

The ofﬁcial commentary

“attach materially different meanings t0 their [written] manifestations.”

elaborates further:

agreement, there

“Even though

may be no

the parties manifest mutual assent t0 the

is

precisely

same words 0f

contract because of a material difference 0f understanding as t0 the

terms 0f the exchange.” Restatement (Second) ofContractS

That

parties

What occurred

here.

§ 20(1), cmt. c.

same language

Tricore and the Estate agreed to the

(the legal description), but they assigned materially different

meanings

to

it.

Tricore thought the

language included the 318 feet 0f beachfront. The Estate understood, correctly, that
Consequently, there was n0 mutual assent

(i.e.,

it

did not.

no meeting of the minds) on What land was

included in the Tricore PSA.

There are n0 Idaho cases applying Section 20(1) in

particular

this

Nonetheless, Idaho courts have expressly adopted Section 20(1) as the law of the

Konic Int’l Corp.

v.

Spokane Comput.

Svcs.,

circumstance.

state.

See, e.g.,

Ina, 109 Idaho 527, 529, 708 P.2d 932, 934 (Ct. App.

1985) (no meeting of the minds under Section 20(1) where parties assigned materially different

meanings

t0 the

term “ﬁfty-six twenty”); see also Snoderly

v.

Bower, 30 Idaho 484, 485, 166

P.

265, 266 (1917) (no meeting of the minds Where parties assigned materially different meanings to
the term “government rule”). Section 20(1) of the Restatement

The Arizona Supreme Court’s decision
Ariz. 469, 470,

799 P.2d 810, 811

in Hill—Schafer

is

therefore the rule 0f decision.

P ’ship v.

Chilson Family Trust, 165

(Ariz. 1990), although non-binding,

Like Tricore and the Estate, the buyer and

seller

description in their purchase and sale agreement.
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had

is

also directly

0n

point.

different understandings 0f the legal

The buyer understood

that the legal description

was

0f land, whereas the

for 17.3 acres

covered only 15.4 acres.

Id.,

165 Ariz.

at

seller believed, mistakenly, that the legal description

470-472, 799 P.2d

the Restatement, the court invalidated the agreement.

17.

was

Central t0 the court’s reasoning

different interpretations”

by people who

Id.,

Applying Section 20(1) of

at 81 1-13.

165 Ariz.

at

475-76; 799 P.2d

the fact that legal descriptions

aren’t trained t0 read them.

Id.

at

were “susceptible

The court thus

816-

[t0]

rejected

the buyer’s argument that the objective “precision” 0f the legal description controlled over the

parties’ subjective understandings

explained,

and

was no

different than in

the other party thinks he

contract isformed.”

The

Id.,

is

of what they intended t0 buy and

any other context: “Ifone party thinks he

selling another thing,

165 Ariz.

sell.

at

472; 799 P.2d

court’s reasoning in Hill—Schafer

is

at

The
is

rule, the court

buying one thing

n0 meeting 0f the minds occurs, and n0

814 (emphasis added).

persuasive and consistent with Idaho’s adoption 0f

Section 20(1) of the Restatement. Tricore thought the legal description included the 318-foot
section; the Estate correctly understood that

and no enforceable

There

The

trial

The

trial

did not. Thus, there

was no meeting of the minds,

court erred in ﬁnding otherwise”.

There was n0 meeting 0f the minds 0n whether title t0 the “not less than 200
feet of waterfront” retained by the Estate would ever transfer t0 Tricore.

2.

13

contract.

it

is

a second material issue that prevented a meeting 0f the minds and independently

court mistakenly analyzed the lack 0f mutual assent over the 3 18 feet of frontage as a “unilateral mistake.”

the only party that was confused about the 318 feet, but that does not make this a
See generally, Bailey v. Ewing, 105 Idaho 636, 639-40, 671 P.2d 1099, 1102 (1983)
(explaining difference between mutual mistakes and unilateral mistakes). A unilateral mistake analysis would only
apply if Tricore was seeking t0 modzﬁ/ the terms of a valid and enforceable contract based 0n a misrepresentation 0f

R. 2006. Tricore

was undoubtedly

unilateral mistake case.

2005 (“no evidence was presented
224 (COE 366) (confusion over 318 feet “was not

the Estate (Which the trial court found did not exist, and Tricore admitted). See R.
to suggest that the Estate

intentional

by anyone”)

made any

misrepresentations”); EX.

(Mort).
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defeats Tricore’s breach 0f contract claim: Tricore and the Estate failed to reach a distinct and

common

understanding about whether

title

t0 the “not less than

200

feet

of waterfront” would

always remain vested in the Estate, or would be transferred t0 Tricore for development and then
transferred

back

to the Estate.

Testimony
this issue. Tricore

while

it

was being

at trial established that

understood that
platted and

R. 1998; Tr. 259:15-261

lots.

it

Tricore and the Estate were never 0n the

would take

title

t0 the “not less than

improved and then transfer

:1

(Mort).

The

Estate,

by

back

title

200

feet

same page 0n
of waterfront”

t0 the Estate as

two ﬁnished

contrast, never intended t0 relinquish

R. 1998; Tr. 785222-7875, 815:1-817:7, 821:4-14 (Finney). Finney testiﬁed that the Estate

title.

was

acutely aware 0f the perils 0f a “transfer and transfer back” arrangement, always intended to retain

title,

and would not have transferred

it

t0 Tricore in order t0 avoid putting itself at risk. Tr. 8 1 5 :20-

816: 13 (Finney). In short, testimony at

of the minds 0n whether title
to Tricore.

The
is

That
trial

failure

unequivocally established that there was no meeting

t0 the “not less than

200

feet ofwaterfront”

would ever be transferred

of mutual assent on a material term rendered the Tricore

PSA void.

court dismissed this issue as a “red herring” and issued erroneous ﬁndings that

“it

undisputed that both sides mutually agreed that the Estate would retain 200 feet” 0f lakefront

from Parcel A. Whether the 200
lots

were plotted does not

The

14

trial

trial

Notably, the

clear

trial

feet

was carved out of the deed

alter the validity

The parties never reached a mutual

PSA referenc ed exactly 200 feet 0f waterfront, despite
“not less than 200 feet 0f waterfront.” Ex. 213 (COE 344 at 1] 5).

court erroneously found that the Tricore
state

closing or deeded back after the

0f their Agreement.” R. 2007.

court’s analysis misses the fundamental issue:

and unambiguous terms Which

at

30

its

understanding 0f whether the Estate would retain 0r relinquish

title

t0 the “not less than

0f waterfront,” a material term 0f the Tricore PSA. For this additional
trial

D.

court erred in ﬁnding the Tricore

Even

if

Even

if the Tricore

the Tricore

PSA was
PSA

failure

200

feet

0f mutual assent, the

PSA enforceable.
a Valid Contract, Tricore Repudiated

had been enforceable (Which

established that Tricore repeatedly repudiated

it

it

was

it.

not), the

evidence

at trial

in response t0 misunderstandings regarding

its

most material terms.

A

repudiation occurs

performance.” Foley

v.

when

Munio, 105 Idaho 309, 31

be either express 0r implied. Jensen

The question

is

31

1,

669 P.2d

v.

1,

669 P.2d 198, 200 (1983).

Chandler, 77 Idaho 303, 307, 291 P.2d 1116, 1118 (1955).

v.

Liebelt, 118 Idaho 845, 849, 801 P.2d 52,

contract as ended, as far as further performance

at

A repudiation can

whether the party’s words 0r actions are “inconsistent with the existence 0f the

contract.” Liebelt

may “treat the

a party “renounces his obligation before the time for

is

56 (1990). If so, the other party
concerned.” Foley, 105 Idaho

at

200.

Section 250 of the Restatement (Second) ofContracts
part, that refusal to

is

instructive.

It

provides, in relevant

perform unless the terms 0f an agreement are modiﬁed constitutes repudiation:

[W]here a party wrongfully

states that

he will not perform

at all

unless the other party consents to a modiﬁcation of his contract
rights, the statement is a repudiation

he seeks
to exact

is

even though the concession that

a minor one, because the breach that he threatens in order

it is

a complete refusal 0f performance.

Restatement (Second) ofContracts

§

250 (1981) (Comment D).

Tricore’s refusal t0 perform unless the Estate agreed t0 absurd concessions falls squarely
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within the Restatement language. Tricore insisted that the Estate would need to take a $560,000
hit

and put new items 0n the table

367) Tricore’s

new demands

wanted the transaction t0 move forward. EX. 224 (COE 366-

if it

included: (1) a $300,000 reduction in purchase price; (2) the transfer

of a private water system owned by the Estate worth
to the property;

and

(COE

brand-new terms

that

Dan Warren’s

366-67); Tr. 8353-83727 (Finney).

were not included

admitted that Tricore employed

$100,000, along with

all

water rights

of up t0 160,000 cubic yards 0f ﬁll material worth n0

(3) a grant

$480,000 from co-personal representative
2000; EX. 224

at least

it’s

the Estate believe that the deal

in the Tricore

gravel

pit, at

n0 cost

off,

t0 Tricore. R. 1999-

The water system and

ﬁll material

were

PSA. EX. 2 1 3 (COE 329-45). Mort candidly

“fear 0f not closing” negotiation tactic,

was

less than

and did everything

it

worked hard

t0

make

could t0 be “as convincing as

possible” about not closing. Tr. 252:4-7, 252223-25321, 253:21-24, 249225-2503 (Mort).
In the ﬁnal analysis, Tricore told the Estate that

it

would not move forward unless the Estate

agreed t0 both reduce the purchase price by hundreds of thousands 0f dollars

hundreds of thousands of dollars more.
further obligations under the Tricore

repudiate the Tricore

E.

ﬂi add items worth

That was a repudiation that freed the Estate from any

PSA. The

trial

court erred in ﬁnding that Tricore did not

PSA.

Because the Trial Court Erred in Ruling a Valid Enforceable Contract Between
Tricore and the Estate, it Necessarilv Erred in Ruling that the Estate Violated the

ICPA.
Because the Tricore
of a meeting ofthe minds
that Tricore’s

ICPA

PSA was unenforceable under the statute of frauds and due to a failure

or, in the alternative, repudiation, this

claim

fails as

Court must also necessarily decide

a matter 0f law and reverse the
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trial

court

0n

that basis.

Furthermore, as discussed below, Tricore did not carry

To
the party

its

burden in other crucial respects.

bring a claim under the ICPA, the plaintiff “must have a contractual relationship” with

who

allegedly violated the statute. Taylor

642, 662 (2010); Doble
(2016); Haskz’n

v.

v.

Interstate

v.

McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 846, 243 P.3d

Amusements, Ina, 160 Idaho 307, 309, 372 P.3d 362, 364

Glass, 102 Idaho 785, 788, 640 P.2d 1186, 1189 (1982).

As

discussed at length

PSA

above, Tricore and the Estate did not have an enforceable contract because the Tricore
violated the statute of frauds and there

alternative,

was no meeting of the minds on material terms

01‘,

in the

because Tricore repudiated the Tricore PSA. Accordingly, Tricore’s breach 0f contract

claim — and therefore

its

ICPA

claim — failed as a matter 0f law.

Moreover, Tricore failed t0 prove an unfair or unconscionable practice Within the ambit of
the

ICPA. The only wrongful

in the deception

act that Tricore attributed t0 the Estate is that

it

supposedly “engaged

0f leading Tricore on with the belief that closing was imminent and a meeting

With Tricore would be set up, while they hastily entered into an agreement between themselves t0
sell the

property t0 Stockton and Brinkmeyer.” R. 1899. The

actions

by

trial

court agreed and found these

the Estate against Tricore to be “misleading and deceptive and constitute a Violation”

of the ICPA. R. 2018-19.

However, the meeting
September “counter[offer]”
dirt.”

its

EX. 44

(COE

167).

that Tricore references

were engaged

its

demand

t0 purchase the property for $2.25 million

The

fact that Tricore

claim that the Estate was “leading

the Estate

was

it

0n.”

t0 discuss Tricore’s early

and “a dollar a yard for

[ﬁll]

was making a counteroffer 0n new terms disproves

At

the time the counteroffer

in arms-length negotiations t0 enter into
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was made, Tricore and

a new contract. After

all,

the

water system, water

rights,

and

were never part 0f the Tricore PSA; Tricore could hardly

ﬁll dirt

have thought that the parties were working toward a closing 0n that contract.

The

fact that the Estate

never scheduled a meeting was neither unfair nor unconscionable.

The Estate had no obligation t0 meet With Tricore. Tricore may have wanted t0 continue discussing
a

new

contract, but

contract and a

was

new

under the circumstances the Estate was free
buyer.

willing t0 meet,

its

T0 Whatever

actions

may have

extent the Estate

and move 0n

to a

new

led Tricore to believe that

it

were not actionable under the ICPA.

For the foregoing reasons, the
F.

t0 decline

trial

court erred in ﬁnding a Violation 0f the

ICPA.

The Trial Court Erred in Finding That Stockton Tortiouslv Interfered With Tricore’s
Contractual Rights.
Pursuant t0 Idaho Appellate Rule 35(h), Stockton adopts by reference the following

Argument

sections

from the Brief 0f Appellant Todd Brinkmeyer:

for tortious interference if the Tricore

PSA violates the

statute

of frauds),

PSA is void), I.B.2.

I.C.

1 .b.

intent”

(Stockton cannot be liable

(Stockton cannot be liable if the Tricore

(Tricore cannot establish interference with contract if

Stockton owns a valid right of ﬁrst refusal), I.C.2.a.

ﬁnd “improper

I.B. 1.

court used the

(trial

by Stockton and Brinkmeyer),

wrong

legal standard t0

I.C.2.b. (trial court failed to consider

Stockton’s good-faith belief in the validity of the right 0f ﬁrst refusal in determining whether his

conduct was improper and justiﬁed), and I.D. (evidence did not show that Stockton intentionally

and improperly interfered with the Tricor PSA, caused
1.

The

its

breach, of acted without justiﬁcation).

The trial court erred by determining that Stockton’s right 0f ﬁrst refusal
wasn’t valid 0r enforceable and by barring testimony relating t0 it.
trial

court found that Stockton agreed t0
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move

his property line in

1989 t0 allow

Bill

and Elaine Warren
exchange for

Brinkmeyer’s parents, and that “[i]n

t0 sell additional lakefront property t0

this concession, Bill

and Elaine Warren promised

t0 give Stockton the ﬁrst right t0

purchase any additional Priest Lake property they offered for sale.” R. 2016-2017. Contrary to

own

ﬁndings, the

noted that
that

PLBM,

court subsequently characterized the right 0f ﬁrst refusal as “ludicrous,”

“was never reduced t0 writing,” and found that

any 0f the Estate’s

based the

trial

it

trial

latter

ﬁndings on

earlier ruling

its

“[t]here is nothing 0f record indicating

0f ﬁrst refusal.” R. 2017. The

real property is subject t0 a right

on motions

in limine

When

it

trial

court

prohibited the Estate,

Stockton, and Brinkmeyer from introducing evidence 0f Stockton’s right 0f ﬁrst refusal at

on the basis of the dead man’s

23217.

its

The

trial

statute (LC. § 9-202(3))

and I.R.E. 601(b). R. 1318;

Tr. 21 10-

court also found that the dead man’s statute rendered Stockton’s right 0f

:

first

refusal legally unenforceable as a matter 0f law. R. 1318; Tr. 21 10-23:17 (Oct. 26, 2018) (ﬁnding
:

Stockton could not have asserted such a claim against the Estate under the dead man’s statute and
the statute 0f frauds).

The

trial

court erred because neither the dead man’s statute nor the lack 0f a

writing render Stockton’s right 0f ﬁrst refusal unenforceable 0r evidence of it inadmissible.”

The dead man
Rather,

it

statute

does not render Stockton’s right 0f ﬁrst refusal legally unenforceable.

“pr0hibit[s] a party

making a claim against an

communication with the deceased.” Lunders
372, 381-82 (1998). Accordingly,

it

v.

testifying as to

15

made an

Stockton

claim

is

not against the estate. Argyle

offer 0f proof, reading into the record

testimony would have shown regarding the right of ﬁrst refusal. Tr. 23: 18-25: 17. The

And

any unwritten

“prohibits testimony introduced against the estate 0f a

if the party’s

PLBM, and

from

Estate ofSnyder, 131 Idaho, 689, 698-99, 963 P.2d

deceased person” and does not apply

Counsel for the Estate,

estate

once again, n0 term, perpetual right 0f ﬁrst refusal, n0 legal description.”
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trial

What the anticipated
“Thank you.

court replied,

Tr. 25:18-20.

v.

Slemaker, 99 Idaho 544, 547-48, 585 P.2d 954, 957-58 (1978). Furthermore,

evidence used to defend against a claim.” Lowry
22, 25 n.1 (Ct.

v.

“does not apply t0

Ireland Bank, 116 Idaho 708, 711

App. 1989). Because Stockton made no claim against the

to introduce evidence

it

n.

1

,

779 P.2d

Estate, but rather sought

of his right 0f ﬁrst refusal to defend against a claim, the

trial

court erred in

prohibiting evidence 0f his right 0f ﬁrst refusal.

In addition, the party entitled to object to the testimony

—

the Estate

— not only

failed t0

object but also sought t0 introduce testimony concerning Bill and Elain Warren’s communications

about Stockton’s right 0f ﬁrst refusal. See Smith
(1973) (holding statute
the estate and

is

may

Smith, 95 Idaho 477, 482, 511 P.2d 294, 299

v.

only be asserted by a representative 0r a party having an interest in

not available to claimants against the estate). Because the dead man’s statute does

not render the offered evidence inadmissible, the

trial

court erred in holding otherwise.

The trial court also erred when it held that a right of ﬁrst refusal must be reduced to writing.

A right of ﬁrst refusal operates as a preemptive right, vesting in the holder a superior contractual
right to purchase the property to

52,

which

it is

subject.

Hancock v. Dusenberry, 110 Idaho

715 P.2d 360, 364-65 (1986). Although a right 0f ﬁrst refusal

Idaho Code

§

9-503, this Court has

made

being validlyformed;

The

it

The

statute

v.

S V Company, Ina, 102 Idaho

if

one party refuses

t0 perform:

expressed the effect 0f the statute of frauds as

preventing theformation 0f a contract. The statute of frauds does not prevent the
creation 0f an oral contract but precludes the contract’s enforcement.
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187,

0f frauds does not prevent such contracts from

merely renders them unenforceable

district court incorrectly

subject to the statute of frauds,

clear that oral contracts affecting an interest in real

property are just as valid as written agreements. Hoffman
189-90, 628 P.2d 218, 220-21 (1981).

is

147, 151-

Treasure Valley Gastroenterology Specialists, P.A.

25 (2001)

(italicized

Thus,

emphasis in

When both

Woods, 135 Idaho 485, 489

n.1,

20 P.2d 21,

original).

parties t0 an oral right

and the Estate did here, the

v.

statute

of frauds

is

0f ﬁrst refusal perform as promised, as Stockton
not implicated. Frantz

v.

Parke, 111 Idaho 1005,

1008-09, 729 P.2d 1068 (Ct. App. 1986). Tricore, as a stranger t0 the contract, does not have
standing t0 contest

1096

(Ct.

statute

it.

See Mikesell

App. 1992) (holding

v.

Newworld Dev. Corp, 122 Idaho

that non-party to oral

agreement t0 convey land could not enforce

of frauds where neither party t0 the oral agreement denied

The

trial

determining that

868, 874, 840 P.2d 1090,

its

existence and validity).

court erred in barring testimony regarding Stockton’s right of ﬁrst refusal and in

it

was

invalid and unenforceable.

The evidence at trial did not establish that Stockton intentionally and
improperly interfered With the Estate’s performance under the Tricore PSA.

2.

There are four elements t0 a claim for tortious interference With a contract 0r tortious
interference With a business expectancy: (a) the existence of a valid contract (or business

expectancy); (b) knowledge of the contract (or business expectancy) by the defendant; (c)
intentional interference that causes a breach;

and

(d) injury t0 the plaintiff resulting

from the

breach. Idaho First Nat’l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Ina, 121 Idaho 266, 283, 824 P.2d 841, 858
(1991). Because tortious interference

defendant’s conduct

intent

is

an intentional

was motivated by wrongful

intent.

tort,

the plaintiff

Id. at

must prove

that the

286, 824 P.2d at 861. Wrongful

can be proven in two ways: (1) the defendant had “an improper obj ective 0r purpose t0 harm

the plaintif

;”

0r (2) the “defendant used a wrongful
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means”

to inﬂict the

harm.

Id.

Either way,

the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s interference

the fact 0f the interference itself.” Id. If the plaintiff

interference, the

burden

Circumstances. Barlow

v.

shifts t0 the

Int’l

was “wrongful by some measure beyond
makes a prima

defendant to prove

facie case for tortious

conduct was justiﬁable under the

its

Harvester C0., 95 Idaho 881, 893, 522 P.2d 1102, 1114 (1974).

The trial court erred in ﬁnding that Tricore made a prima facie case
because Stockton and Brinkmeyer did not act With the requisite wrongful
sake 0f argument that Tricore could

make

a prima facie case, the

trial

intent.

Assuming

court erred

ﬁnd that Stockton and Brinkmeyer’s conduct was not justiﬁable under the
First, the trial

for tortious interference

for the

by refusing

to

circumstances.

court erred in ﬁnding that Stockton and Brinkmeyer acted with “an improper

objective 0r purpose t0

harm” Tricore 0r that

harm. Idaho First Nat’l Bank, 121 Idaho

at

either

0f them “used a wrongful means” to inﬂict the

283, 824 P.2d at 841. At

trial,

Mort conceded

that

he

never had any personal interaction with Stockton, was not aware 0f Stockton harboring any bias,
animus, or

ill-Will

that Stockton

toward him or Tricore, and was not aware of any wrongful 0r improper intent

might have harbored or acted upon as

303:10-14 (Mort).

He was

similarly not aware 0f

Brinkmeyer might have harbored or acted upon as
(Mort).

The bottom

line is that

conduct or any improper

Brinkmeyer whatsoever.
that they

Mort testiﬁed

intent,

it

relates to

himself 0r Tricore. Tr. 302: 14-24,

any wrongful or improper
it

that

relates to

intent that

PLBM or

himself 0r Tricore. Tr. 347:9-348:6

he was unaware of any wrongful 0r improper

means, methods, or purposes employed by Stockton 0r

Id. (testifying that his

complaint against Stockton and Brinkmeyer was

had bought the property he wanted, but otherwise had no complaints about independent

wrongdoing,

intent,

means, methods, 0r purposes employed by Stockton 0r Brinkmeyer).
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Interference alone

is

not enough; the plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted for the purpose

0f causing the plaintiff harm. Idaho First Nat ’l Bank, 121 Idaho
Enterprises, Inc.

v.

at

286, 824 P.2d at 861; Highland

Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 340-41, 986 P.2d 996, 986 P.2d 996, 1006 (1999).

Tricore’s tort claim fails because Stockton and Brinkmeyer did not act for the purpose 0f harming

Tricore.

They simply wanted t0 purchase

Second, the

trial

the Property for themselves.

court erred in ﬁnding that the interference attributed to Stockton and

Brinkmeyer was without justiﬁcation. Stockton and Brinkmeyer both relied 0n Stockton’s superior
right t0 purchase the Property pursuant t0 his right

Stockton have acknowledged for decades.

As

0f ﬁrst refusal — a right that both the Estate and

discussed above,

it

operated as a preemptive right,

vesting in Stockton a superior contractual right t0 purchase the Property. See Hancock, 110 Idaho

at

151-52, 715 P.2d at 364-65. Stockton and Brinkmeyer both testiﬁed that they believed that the

right

of ﬁrst refusal was valid based upon their personal knowledge of the circumstances under

Which

it

was granted and

the fact that the Estate’s representatives

had acknowledged

it

several

times after Bill Warren’s death. Tr. 568:2-13, 569:7-570:3, 570221-57211 (Stockton); Tr. 705221706: 1 7 (Brinkmeyer). Further substantiating their belief, the

to

move

his property line in

trial

court found that Stockton agreed

1989 t0 allow Bill and Elaine Warren t0

sell additional lakefront

property t0 Brinkmeyer’s parents, and “[i]n exchange for this concession, Bill and Elaine Warren

promised

t0 give Stockton the ﬁrst right t0 purchase

any additional Priest Lake property they

offered for sale.” R. 1995. That genuinely held belief in a contractual right, Which

a

trial

court ﬁnding, demonstrates that Stockton and Brinkmeyer’s conduct
In any event, With 0r Without a right of ﬁrst refusal, Stockton and
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is

supported by

was justiﬁable.

Brinkmeyer were

free t0

ask the Estate to

sell the

Property to them rather than to Tricore.

talk t0 third parties about the subj ect

if

it is

willing to compensate the other party for any

Sch. Trustees

is

party”).

As

damages

ofMadison Consol. Sch, 876 F.3d 926, 938

a corollary, there

is

at trial

that

may result.

See

(7th Cir. 2017) (“After

it is

Willing t0

Elliott

free t0

contract

v.

Bd. 0f

all,

a party t0 a

pay damages

t0 the other

in place.

is

demonstrated that Stockton and Brinkmeyer had n0 improper purpose,

used n0 wrongful means, and

their

Stockton’s right 0f ﬁrst refusal.

Brinkmeyer

is

nothing that prohibits third parties from discussing the subject 0f

a contract simply because a contract

The evidence

a contract

may even choose t0 abandon the

ordinarily free t0 breach the contract as long as

contract

G.

of the contract, and

A party to

conduct was entirely justiﬁable under the circumstances given

As

a result, the

trial

court erred in ﬁnding that Stockton and

tortiously interfered with Tricore’s contractual 0r business expectations.

The Trial Court Erred in Finding That Stockton, Brinkmever and the Estate Engaged
in a Civil Conspiracv.

Civil conspiracy requires a valid underlying tort claim.

1.

Tricore cannot assert “civil conspiracy” as an independent tort claim.
“the civil

conspiracy claim

is

conspiracy

McPheters

If there is

itself.”

n0

“civil

of law because

conspiracy

tort,

and

until

as the objective 0f the conspiracy, not the

Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 395, 64 P.3d 317, 64 P.3d 317, 321 (2003).

wrong committed as

civil

be an underlying

v.

wrong committed

The essence of a civil

is not,

the objective 0fthe conspiracy,” the claim fails as a matter

by

itself,

a claim for

relief. Id.

such act occurs, n0 conspiracy

Idaho 378, 233 P. 885-86 (1925). Because the

trial

40

The

exists.

gist

0f the action must

Dahlquist

v.

Mattson, 40

court erred in holding the Estate liable for

breach of contract and Stockton liable for tortious interference, the judgment for

must

also be reversed because civil conspiracy requires a

judgment

civil

conspiracy

for an underlying tort claim.

This Court should reverse the predicate legal claims as well as the conspiracy claim.

Because the Estate cannot conspire t0 breach
and Brinkmeyer cannot conspire with it.

2.

To prove

PLBM,

liability

0n a

civil

its

own

contract, then Stockton

conspiracy theory, Tricore needed to show that the Estate,

Stockton, and Brinkmeyer set out to “accomplish an unlawful objective 0r t0 accomplish

a lawful objective in an unlawful manner.” McPheters

321 (2003). Damages

v.

Maile, 138 Idaho at 395, 64 P.3d 3 17 at

may only then be awarded “for the tort that they conspired t0 commit.” Saint

Alphonsus Diversiﬁed Care,

Inc.

v.

MRIAssociates, LLP, 157 Idaho 106, 123

797 n.4 (2014). However, n0 Idaho court has recognized a
party breaching

Brinkmeyer

its

own contract. As

at II.B.,

stated in the

which adopted by

Argument

this reference

civil

n.4,

334 P.3d 780,

conspiracy claim based upon a

section in the Brief 0f Appellant

pursuant t0 I.A.R. 35(h), the

trial

Todd

court’s

determination that Stockton and Brinkmeyer committed a civil conspiracy should be reversed.

H.

The Trial Court Erred in Awarding Attornev Fees to Tricore Against Stockton,
Brinkmever and the Estate, Particularlv 0n a Joint and Several Basis.
Assuming

that the Court

the current appeal, an

ﬁnds

in favor

0f the Estate,

award 0f attorney fees and costs

Nonetheless, even assuming that the Estate,
prevail

0n

all

issues herein, the court’s

PLBM,

t0 Tricore is

PLBM,

award 0f attorney

fees

Stockton, and Brinkmeyer in

wholly inappropriate.

Stockton, and Brinkmeyer do not

and costs was

in error because: (1)

Tricore failed t0 identify speciﬁc authority supporting an award of attorney fees and costs on each

claim against each 0f Stockton, Brinkmeyer, and the Estate; (2) Tricore
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is

not entitled t0 recover

attorney fees and costs against Stockton and Brinkmeyer; (3) Tricore’s failure t0 apportion attorney
fees

and costs prohibits any recovery 0f the same; and

and costs on a joint and several basis
In

its

motion for attorney

for attorney fees

PSA,

in the Tricore

ICPA.
costs

to

do

was

It

and

costs. It

is

award 0f attorney

fees

unsupportable.

fees, Tricore did

was not

(4) the trial court’s

not identify the authority supporting

clear Whether Tricore relied

0n the attorney

its

request

fees provision

the commercial transaction attorney fees statute (LC. § 12-120(3)), 0r the

was incumbent 0n Tricore

to identify the speciﬁc authority pursuant t0

Which

fees

might be awarded — 0n each claim and as against each defendant. But Tricore made n0
that and, as such, Tricore failed to properly support

its

and

effort

request with speciﬁc authority. This

fatal to its claim.

“It is

well established that attorney fees and costs cannot be awarded unless they are

authorized by statute 0r

by

contract.” Allison

v.

John M. Biggs, Ina, 121 Idaho 567, 568, 826 P.2d

916, 917 (1992). Tricore did not point t0 any statute or contract that
costs to

be awarded on

contract exists.

its tort

And no

contract. Furthermore,

fees

and

claims against Stockton and Brinkmeyer because no such statute or

statute allows

an award of attorney fees for

civil

conspiracy t0 breach a

because Stockton and Brinkmeyer were not parties to the Tricore PSA, the

attorney fee provision in that agreement does not apply.

only allowed against the Estate

That leaves

would allow attorney

I.C. §

at trial, the fee-shifting

And

because Tricore’s

ICPA

claim was

provision in that statute also does not apply.

12-120(3), which allows for recovery of attorney fees on claims to

enforce a contract involving a commercial transaction. That statute also does not apply. This Court

has repeatedly held that LC. § 12-120(3) cannot support an award of fees 0n tort claims like the
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ones

at issue here:

I.C. §

action

12—1208) mandates an award 0f attorney fees in any civil
t0 recover 0n a “contract relating t0 the purchase 0r sale of

goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial
transaction...” Tortious interference with a contract
t0

an action

not an action

v.

a prevailing party 0n a claim for tortious
not entitled t0 attorneyfees under I.C. § 12—120(3).

in tort. Thus,

interference

Thirsty’s L.L.C.

is

recover 0n a contract, nor a commercial transaction, but rather

is

Tolerico, 143 Idaho 48, 51, 137 P.3d 435,

also Northwest Bec-Corp.

v.

Home Living Service,

438 (2006) (emphasis added); see

136 Idaho 835, 842, 41 P.3d 263, 270 (2002)

(no fees 0n tort claims under LC. § 12-120(3)); Bybee

v.

Isaac, 145 Idaho 251, 260-61, 178 P.3d

616, 625-26 (2007) (same).
Importantly, the civil conspiracy claim

judgment

for attorney fees

and costs apply

was

the sole basis for the

t0 Stockton

trial

court’s order that the

and Brinkmeyer 0n a joint and several

basis.” See generally R. 1991-2025. However, Tricore’s entitlement t0 relief and damages for a

civil

conspiracy claim

Inc.

v.

Inc.

v.

is

limited t0 the underlying cause 0f action. See

Wesco Autobody Supply,

Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 898, 243 P.3d 1069, 1086 (2010); SaintAlphonsus Diversified Care,

MRI Assocs.,

LLP, 157 Idaho 106, 129

persons or entities conspired to commit a

They can only be awarded

tort,

n.4,

334 P.3d 780, 803 (2014) (“[I]ftwo or more

damages cannot be awarded

for the tort that they conspired t0

commit”). Because attorney fees are

not permissible for tortious interference claims, the predicate cause 0f action

16

for the conspiracy.

—

civil

conspiracy

—

between the Estate and Stockton and Brinkmeyer. Tricore
Because the trial court did not
ﬁnd the Estate was liable in tort, Stockton and Brinkmeyer could not have been a concurrent tortfeasor with the Estate.
See Insurance Associates Corp. v. Hansen, 116 Idaho 948, 953, 782 P.2d 1230 (1989).
Notably, Tricore did not allege joint and several

liability

also did not seek t0 hold Stockton liable for the Estate’s fault as a concurrent tortfeasor.
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did not afford the court a basis to award attorney fees t0 Tricore against Stockton and Brinkmeyer.

If fees

were permissible under

tortious interference claim

contradictory t0 Idaho

this

methodology, a conspiracy Claim could be tied t0 every single

and allow the recovery attorney

Supreme Court precedent

fees.

This of course

that precludes the recovery

is

directly

0f fees for tortious

interference claims under LC. § 12-120.
Finally, Tricore is not entitled t0 recover

t0 apportion fees

its

attorney fees and costs because

it

Wholly failed

and costs asserted against Stockton and Brinkmeyer as between the claims. The

billing statements submitted

by Tricore’s law ﬁrms conﬁrm

attorney fees and costs, including time billed and costs incurred

and Brinkmeyer. Tricore’s
any attorney fees and

0n

failure t0 apportion these attorney fees

costs.

was claiming

that Tricore

its tort

not,

nofees are

t0

0f

its

claims against Stockton

and costs precludes an award of

“Where fees [are] not apportioned between a claim

under I. C. § 12-120(3) and one that does

all

that qualiﬁes

be awarded.” Rockefeller

136 Idaho 637, 645, 39 P.3d 577, 585 (2001) (emphasis added); see also Weaver

v.

v.

Grabow,

Searle Bros.,

129 Idaho 497, 502, 927 P.2d 887, 892 (1996) (n0 fees 0r costs can be awarded “where the party
claiming entitlement t0 the fees [has] not isolated or separated the fees attributable t0 the contract

claim from those attributable to another claim not covered by I.C. § 12-120(3)”).
In sum, the court erred in granting Tricore’s request for attorney fees and costs.

I.

The Estate
The

is

Entitled t0 an

Award

0f Attornev Fees and Costs.

Estate requests attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3) and costs pursuant t0 I.C. §

12-107 and Idaho Appellate Rule 40. Under LC.

§ 12-120(3),

“when a commercial

transaction

comprises the gravamen 0f a lawsuit, the prevailing party shall be awarded attorney fees.” First
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Bank ofLincoln

v.

Land Title ofNeZ Perce

A prevailing

(citations omitted).

party

County, Inc, 165 Idaho 813, 452 P.3d 835, 846 (2019)

may be awarded

attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) in

circumstances where a contract or commercial transaction was only alleged by the opposing party,
but never actually existed. Id.; see also Intermountain Real Properties,

Idaho 3 13, 320, 3 1

1

that the

court awards the defendant attorney fees”); Garner

1) (noting that

a party

v.

commercial contract never existed, the

Povey, 15 1 Idaho 462, 469, 259 P.3d 608,

may “recover under the commercial transaction prong 0f LC.

Where the opposing party has alleged a commercial transaction

120(3),

regardless of whether a commercial event occurred). If the Estate

entitled to attorney fees

rule that the Estate

is

the prevailing party and

court 0n

all

the prevailing party,

issues outlined herein

award

its

this

it is

Court should

attorney fees and costs.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Estate,
trial

is

§ 12-

as the basis 0f his claim”

and costs 0n appeal. For the reasons described above,

V.

the

Draw, LLC, 155

P.3d 734, 741 (2013) (“[W]hen a plaintiff alleges a commercial contract exists

and the defendant successfully defends by showing

615 (201

LLC v.

PLBM, and

Stockton request that this Court reverse

and award the Estate

its

attorney fees and costs.
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